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Abstract
In the Internet, users interact with service providers; these interactions exchange information
that might be considered private by the user. Existing schemes for expressing and enforcing user
privacy on the Internet—notably notice and consent—are inadequate to address privacy needs
of Internet users. This paper suggests a new, practical, and expressive policy tag scheme that
would enable users to express both control-based and secrecy-based restrictions. We identify
key design goals, explore various design choices that impact these goals, and outline a proposed
implementation—called avenance tags—that realizes these goals.
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1 Introduction
In the Internet, users interact with service providers (e.g., Amazon, Facebook, Bank of America).
These interactions involve attributes that are explicitly disclosed by the user and behaviors that
can be observed during the interaction. Some or all of this information might be considered private
by the user.
Definitions of privacy typically incorporate elements of secrecy [18, 39, 46, 1] and of control [16,
17, 24, 1]. Early privacy protection standards—including the OECD guidelines [37] and the FTC
fair information practice principles (FIPPs) [15]—exemplify this dichotomy. Secrecy is inherent
in the OECD Collection Limitation principle and the FTC Notice/Awareness principle, which
give users the right to make informed decisions about what data are collected or shared. Control
underlies the OECD Use Limitation principle and the FTC Choice/Consent principle, which each
give users the right to limit uses or choose how personal information should be used.
The current regime for expressing and enforcing user privacy on the Internet—called notice
and consent—is intended to implement FIPPs. Under notice and consent, each service provider
publishes a list of data practices (what information will be collected and what will or will not be done
with it). This site privacy policy is typically a long document, available somewhere on the service
provider’s website. The act of using a service or sharing data with it is interpreted as consenting to
the data uses published in the service provider’s site privacy policy. The presumption is that notice
and consent enables free, informed consent, resulting in a satisfactory trade-off between privacy
and economic benefits. But does it?
The answer is no. Fifteen years of critiques [3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 26, 35, 36, 38, 42, 40, 34] suggest
that notice and consent is inadequate to address privacy needs of Internet users. One problem is
that notice and consent gives users a single all-or-nothing choice: to decline the service or to consent
to the published data practices and share the requested information. In many cases, providers of
equivalent services publish similar site privacy policies—and many such services are socially or
economically necessary—so users, left with no real choice, are coerced to consent. Notice and
consent thus compresses the space of user choices to a single option: whether or not to reveal
certain data (secrecy). It fails to adequately implement FIPPs by failing to give practical means
for users to express and control how their data are used.
In response to all this criticism, there is a resurgent focus on viewing privacy in terms of
limitations on data use. In some cases, the emphasis is placed on preventing harmful uses without
explicit user control [8, 9]; in others, the emphasis is on enabling user control over data uses [28, 34].
Since different users are likely to have different opinions regarding what constitutes a privacy
violation and since there is no consensus on how to define “harmful,” we focus on options for
enabling user control.
Data use can occur at any point after data is collected, so control over data use naturally aligns
with the idea of policy tags. Policy tags are digital artifacts that travel with a value and express
limitations on how that value may be used. The ideas behind policy tags can be traced to early
work on Owner-Retained Access Control [29]. Forms of policy tags have been previously used in
database systems [47, 33] and information flow control systems [12, 27]. Several recent proposals
address problems with notice and consent by employing some form of policy tag [38, 25, 2, 13, 5,
6, 28, 34]. However, this prior work has failed to adequately address all the shortcomings of notice
and consent.1
This paper therefore suggests a new, practical, and expressive policy tag scheme that would
enable user control over data at all times and in all contexts. We identify key design goals, explore
1We identify and discuss five shortcomings of notice and consent in Section 2.
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various design choices that impact these goals, and outline a proposed implementation—called
avenance tags—that realizes these goals.
2 Shortcomings of Notice and Consent
Each user has a user privacy policy that defines which interactions would constitute privacy vio-
lations involving that user’s data. User privacy policies might include conditions like “my privacy
is violated if any service provider knows my age” or “my privacy is violated if I am displayed an
ad that was targeted based on my gender.” Privacy-enhancing schemes attempt to enable users
to express these user privacy policies (and enable service providers to comply with user privacy
policies) without imposing restrictions that might disproportionately inhibit utility or economic
benefits.
Under notice and consent, users in effect communicate their user privacy policy by selectively
granting or withholding consent to data uses published in a site privacy policy. As long as consent is
freely given by a fully-informed user, notice and consent allows the user to decide whether the trade-
off between privacy and utility is equitable. However, coerced or uninformed consent introduces
opportunities for privacy violations.
In this section, we identify five shortcomings of notice and consent that result in coerced or
uninformed consent: the problem of expressiveness, the problem of scalability, the problem of
transparency, the problem of user policy revision, and the problem of enforcement.
Expressiveness. Under notice and consent, users are presented with an all-or-nothing choice
for each interaction: use the service (and accept the site privacy policy for all data) or decline to
use the service. Consequently, user privacy degenerates to a question of secrecy (the user decides
whether to reveal certain data by interacting with the service provider), and there is no mechanism
for expressing limitations on data use. Users must consent to all of the disclosed data uses in order
to receive the service. This coerced consent is exacerbated in the case of services that are socially
or economically necessary (e.g., email, employer software, etc.) [8].
Moreover, current practices allow service providers to share data with third parties (as long as
sharing is a disclosed use) without requiring that the site privacy policy either disclose or constrain
data use by third parties. Since notice and consent allows users to express their privacy policy only
by granting or withholding consent, the absence of information about third party uses results in
uninformed consent that might not be consistent with the user privacy policy [32, 25].
Scalability. Notice and consent presumes that a decision is made (whether to consent to the site
privacy policy) for each service provider with which a user interacts. For a user who interacts with
many service providers, reading each site privacy policy is likely to be costly, if not infeasible [11,
26, 7, 42]. By one estimate [31], it would take the average American Internet user 244 hours to
read the privacy policies for all service providers with which they interact in a single year. Not
surprisingly, users typically don’t read the site privacy policy and simply give uninformed consent
to whatever data uses the site privacy policy contains.
Transparency. In order to grant informed consent, a user must actually understand the site
privacy policy. There is evidence that this is not the case [30, 21, 23, 22]. The problem is not syntax.
A high-level policy—one that specifies data uses intensionally and in human-readable language—
will necessarily elide details that might be relevant; a low-level policy—one that describes exactly
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Tag Scheme Expressive. Scalabil. Transpar. Pol. Revision Enforce. Impl.
P3P [38, 25] X X X
PRIME [6] X X X X
Bandhakavi et al. [2] X X X
Bussard et al. [5] X
DNT [13] X X X
SDC [28] X X
Nguyen et al. [34] X
Table 3.1: Extent to which Prior Work Addresses the Shortcomings of Notice and Consent
how all data will be used in all cases—might well present too many details for a user to understand.2
The problem of transparency is compounded by derived values [2, 42]. Big data techniques
give service providers means to infer new, often sensitive or valuable information from apparently
innocuous data. If a site privacy policy only includes data uses for disclosed attributes (currently
a common practice), then the user is not being informed about the use of values derived from
observed behaviors. For example, a user would not be informed if a service provider is never sent
the user’s gender but still targeted ads based on gender inferred from observed HTTP requests.
User Policy Revision. User privacy policies are not necessarily static. If a user’s attribute values
change or new information emerges, that user might reconsider which interactions are acceptable.
Consent to the site privacy policy is now not being freely given after a user has revised their
privacy policy; consent is assumed by a site because notice and consent provides no mechanism for
retracting previously granted consent [3, 40].
Enforcement. Finally, notice and consent relies on service providers voluntarily adhering to the
data uses disclosed in their site privacy policies. There is no comprehensive, effective mechanism for
enforcing privacy policies. If actual data uses deviate (either intentionally or unintentionally) from
uses disclosed in a published site privacy policy, then it is impossible for users to grant informed
consent to the actual data use.
These five shortcomings mean that notice and consent fails to ensure that users are giving free,
informed consent to data sharing and data use. And this, in turn, motivates the need for a new
regime that will solve these problems and enhance the privacy of Internet users.
3 Policy Tags for Internet Privacy
Policy tags—tags that are permanently attached to particular data—appear to be a promising
solution to the problem of expressiveness. This is because tag contents can be accessed whenever
data are used by any service provider (including third parties). Previous efforts have employed
some form of policy tags to enhance Internet privacy [38, 6, 2, 5, 13, 28, 34]. The extent to which
each of these efforts addresses the problems identified in Section 2 is summarized in Table 3.1. None
addresses all of the shortcomings of notice and consent, and several have no complete specification
or current implementation.
2This tradeoff between clarity and detail is what Nissenbaum [36] calls the transparency paradox.
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Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [38, 25] is a framework for enabling users to express and
exercise preferences over service provider privacy practices. Users can communicate preferences to
a client-side software agent that subsequently would negotiate data usage on that user’s behalf.
Data released to a service provider is associated with a tag that references the agreed data-use
policy. An extension for the enterprise setting, E-P3P, adopted the sticky policy paradigm, where
the association between data and policy tags persists even after data are disclosed to another
enterprise. However, P3P policies fail to address the problem of transparency, since data derived
from observations are not tagged, and policy tags are not propagated to derived data. P3P and
E-P3P also do not address the problems of user policy revision and enforcement.
PRIME [6] is an identity management system developed for the European Union. It introduced
obligation tags—a type of policy tag that express event-triggered mandatory actions, like notifica-
tion and information deletion. Obligation tags are enforced by an obligation manager. PRIME also
addressed the problem of scalability by delegating negotiations about data use policies to a trusted
identity provider. Like P3P, PRIME does not solve the problem of transparency—in particular,
it does not attach tags to observed behaviors or propagate policy tags to derived values. It also
doesn’t solve the problem of user policy revision.
Bandhakavi et al. [2] introduces super-sticky release policies, policy tags that are propagated to
derived data. The intention was to handle cases where data aggregates are more or less sensitive
than the original input values; outputs of such operations are associated with modified policy
tags that are generated automatically. Bandhakavi et al. extends the PeerAccess authorization
framework [48] to include these tags. In the extended framework, policies are enforced by peers
in a distributed manner (receivers check that data is tagged with a signed proof that the policy
is satisfied). However, expressiveness is limited, because policy tags are not propagated to third
party service providers. This work also does not address the problems of scalability or user policy
revision.
Bussard et al. [5] investigates a policy language that can express downstream usage policies,
which specify conditions (agreed usage control restrictions) under which information can be released.
They propose XML-based languages with which service providers specify their data-use practice
and the user express—for each service provider in the chain of downstream recipients—how data can
be used. Mutual agreement concerning usage of a piece of information is described in a policy tag
associated (and propagated) with data. This mechanism does not, however, address the problems
of scalability, transparency, user policy revision, or enforcement.
Do Not Track [13] is an effort to combat tracking of users across different websites. It treats
HTTP requests as data, and it associates that data with a particular policy tag (a flag encoding
the policy “do not collect, retain, or derive ads this data”). Do Not Track has been incorporated
into all major web browsers, but it is neither enforced nor widely honored. Do Not Track tags also
do not enable users to express policies about other data or other uses.
Secure Data Capsules [28] propose that sensitive data objects have a policy tag giving prove-
nance and a usage policy. These policy tags are cryptographically bound to the associated data, and
derived data are tagged with a derived policy tag. Untrusted applications can operate on tagged
objects only while inside a secure execution environment that enforces and propagates policy tags.
The proposed system was designed to allow incremental deployment. However, the scheme leaves
many questions unresolved, including how to express policies governing data use and how to attain
acceptable performance overhead. It also does not address the problem of user policy revision.
Nguyen et al. [34] proposes a system that describes policy tags using interoperable metadata.
Under the proposed system, policy tags are integrity-protected and cryptographically bound to
the data. Policy tags would be implemented as references to a single stored copy, enabling user
policy revision (including the often discussed “right to be forgotten”). This approach was never
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implemented, and it leaves unresolved the language for specifying user policies, the scalability and
deployment of such a metadata-based architecture, the propagation of policy tags to derived data,
and the enforcement of such policies.
So the potential for policy tags to enhance user privacy on the Internet is present, but prior
work has not successfully solved all of the existing problems with notice and consent.
4 Avenance Tags
Five goals—derived from the shortcomings identified in Section 2—motivate the design of our
scheme.
(1) Expressiveness: Users should be able to control how their data are used as well as what data
become known (both by a service provider with which they interact and by third parties).
(2) Scalability: The burden placed on users should be reasonable, even if users interact with
many service providers.
(3) Transparency: Privacy policies should be easily understood and transparent. They should
clearly specify how observed data and derived values are used.
(4) User Policy Revision: Users should be allowed to revise privacy policies and, thereafter,
should enforce the revision.
(5) Enforcement: Some enforcement mechanism ensures policy compliances.
In order to realize these goals, we propose a scheme called avenance tags.3 Avenance tags use a
new language for expressing privacy policies (which addresses goals (1) and (3)) and are handled
in the context of an avenance ecosystem (which addresses goals (2),(3),(4), and (5)).
4.1 Policy Language
Differences among existing policy languages are symptomatic of the debate about whether privacy
is about control or secrecy. A policy language might be designed to express limitations on data use
(control), limitations on what predicates about data can be known (secrecy), or both. Each view
comes with advantages and disadvantages for expressiveness and complexity.
The control-based view can be instantiated at various levels of abstraction. At one extreme,
permitted uses (or operations) can be specified using the very programming language that imple-
ments the operations to be controlled. Uses defined in terms of implementation details can be easily
evaluated but yield opaque privacy policies. At the other extreme, whole classes of allowed or dis-
allowed operations can be characterized intensionally by specifying properties that operations to be
controlled must satisfy. Characterizing uses intensionally is difficult but results in more transparent
privacy policies.
At all levels of abstraction, adopting a control-based view of privacy facilitates expressing poli-
cies that depend on future or past uses, but the only way to express a policy about secrecy of
particular values requires knowledge about all operations that generate those values. Such knowl-
edge is rarely available. Moreover, synthesizing tags for derived values requires a complicated
3The term avenance is derived from the French word avenir, meaning future or yet to occur; the etymology is
analogous to that of provenance (from provenir). Avenance tags—which contain privacy policies that describe how
the associated data can be used in the future—are a natural complement to provenance tags—which describe how
the associated data has been used in the past.
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mechanism, because the permitted uses of a derived value might not simply be the intersection of
the permitted uses of the data on which it depends. For example, if a user expresses the policy
“Don’t share this data unless it is encrypted under a secure key,” then the allowed uses for the
output of an encryption function would differ from the allowed uses for the input. Here, the privacy
policy for the output depends on (1) whether the data was used as the plaintext or the key (i.e.,
an encryption takes two inputs and their policies should be treated differently), (2) how the key
was generated (e.g., did it use a good source of randomness), and (3) other operations previously
applied to the key (e.g., a key that previously has been sent in the clear is not secure).
The secrecy-based view of privacy gives rise to policy languages that explicitly express what
predicates about data can become known. Such languages facilitate transparent privacy policies
of the form “no one should know whether I am over 50.” However, the secrecy-based view lacks
a convenient mechanism for expressing privacy policies that inherently depend on data derivation
(e.g., “Do not share information derived from this data unless it has been hashed”). Enforcing
policy compliance is also more difficult; a reference monitor that checks each invoked operation
against the list of permitted uses no longer suffices.
To avoid the debate between these two views, Helen Nissenbaum introduced contextual in-
tegrity [35, 36]. Here, privacy is neither about control nor secrecy but about appropriate flow of
personal information. “Appropriate” is defined by social norms associated with the roles and con-
texts in which information is disclosed. (A version of contextual integrity has been formalized by
Barth et al. [4] using Linear Temporal Logic.) Nissenbaum’s approach, however, can handle only
those cases for which there is an agreed social norm. For example, some users consider behavioral
advertising4 to be a privacy violation while others consider it benign or even useful. So there is
no agreed social norm regarding behavioral advertising; contextual integrity, therefore, cannot be
applied. Unlike Nissenbaum, our underlying philosophy is that the “appropriate” uses and knowl-
edge that characterize a privacy policy are best defined by the user (who may, in turn, adopt social
norms in applicable cases).
In order to enable users to express both control and secrecy, avenance tags generalize the control-
based and secrecy-based views. We model service providers as principals that execute interactive
programs in an environment Γ : Attr → Val that defines a value for each user attribute. Let Envs
be the set of all possible environments. Service providers interact with each other and with users
by sending messages. We can model these messages as containing sets of attribute-value pairs,
consistent with the current environment.
Avenance policies express limitations on the dissemination of particular information. An ave-
nance policy is formalized as a pair 〈C,Θ〉 comprising:
• A set of sensitive classes C ⊆ 2Envs. Each sensitive class C ∈ C is a set of environments.
• A selection predicate Θ : M → Bool evaluated over messages
Policy 〈C,Θ〉 is interpreted as saying that for all principals P , the subset of P ’s outgoing messages
outP satisfying Θ—denoted Θ(outP )—must not reveal that any particular sensitive class C ∈ C
contains the current environment. For instance, the policy “Service providers should not know
my age” could be expressed by defining a sensitive class for each possible value of age (that is,
C = {{Γ : Γ(age) = v} : v ∈ Range(age)}) and by selecting all outgoing messages (that is,
Θ = true). Observe that sensitive classes are not necessarily disjoint. So the privacy policy
4Behavioral advertising is the practice of tracking user behaviors (e.g., websites visited or products viewed),
then inferring user attributes (e.g., gender, political affiliation, income, or hobbies) based on statistical models, and
ultimately displaying ads targeted to those populations (e.g., male car enthusiasts).
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“Service providers should not know my age within 5 years” can be expressed by sensitive classes
containing five-year age ranges (which overlap).
4.2 Auxiliary Information
Some policies (e.g., “service providers can’t know e(Γ)”) can be expressed using selection predicates
that are easy to evaluate (e.g., Θ = true). But not all predicates can be evaluated with the attribute-
value pairs in a message. In order to handle a more expressive class of predicates, and thus support
a more expressive class of policies, avenance tags henceforth are triples 〈C,Θ, a〉, where a is auxiliary
information on which Θ can depend. To motivate this design decision, consider some examples.
We might be interested in a policy like “Don’t store my credit card for more than 30 days.”
A rule like this requires formalizing what it means to “store” data; we might interpret this rule
as “Don’t demonstrate knowledge of credit card after 30 days.” However, “occurs after more than
thirty days” cannot be evaluated given only a credit card value; compliance requires access to
some notion of time. So avenance tags support privacy policies of this type by using auxiliary
information. Here, the auxiliary information would encode an initialization time and the time at
which the message is sent.
Auxiliary information in avenance tags is useful for expressing other types of policies, too, like
“don’t forward data unless authorized by a federal judge” and “don’t display ads derived from age.”
In these cases, auxiliary information would include a signed authorization from a federal judge or
labels indicating that this message contains an ad. A selection predicate then can use this auxiliary
information to identify appropriate outgoing messages.
Provenance is a particularly useful kind of auxiliary information for expressing privacy poli-
cies. A simple provenance-dependent policy is “Don’t send data derived from age.” Moreover, by
incorporating labels on values and operations in the provenance for a value, we can also express
additional policies. For example, “don’t combine data from NSA and FBI” or “don’t release infor-
mation derived from my password unless it has been hashed.” The former depends on value labels to
indicate the data collector while the latter depends on operation labels to identify computationally-
noninvertable hash functions.
So far, we have discussed avenance tags for specifying user-provided privacy policies. However,
restrictions on data use can come from company policy and local, national, or international law.
Such restrictions could be explicitly encoded in individual avenance tags or (for efficiency) could be
omitted but implicitly imposed on all principals operating within some given jurisdiction. In some
cases (e.g., when a user decides to disclose data only because of a company use policy precludes
certain uses) jurisdictional restrictions might have to persist for data that is derived and/or further
forwarded. Here, the original jurisdiction or the jurisdictionally-imposed privacy policy can be
encoded in the auxiliary information prior to leaving the jurisdiction.
4.3 Expressiveness
To appreciate the expressiveness of our policy language, observe that the control-based view and
the secrecy-based view are both captured.
• To express a control-based policy such as “operation op cannot be applied to attribute a,”
we define C = {Envs} and define Θ to select those messages generated by applying op to a.
The derivation history of a value would be encoded in its auxiliary information.
• To express a secrecy-based policy such as “service providers can’t know e(Γ)” for some ex-
pression e, identify sensitive classes with those environments in which e(Γ) has the same value
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and define Θ = true, so all outgoing messages are selected.
Compliance with 〈C,Θ, a〉 can be reduced to an information flow problem. Possibilistic non-
interference [41] states that a change in secret inputs does not affect the set of possible public
outputs.5 For our context, C is identified with high inputs (a separate bit indicates membership in
each sensitive class C ∈ C) and Θ determines which subset of outgoing messages (outputs) are low
(or public). Note, our definition of compliance is weaker than possibilistic noninterference, because
outputs are allowed to reveal non-membership in a class C.
Compliance with 〈C,Θ, a〉 can alternatively be considered through the lens of nondeducibil-
ity [44]. Nondeducibility defines information flow between functions f1 and f2 to occur when, for a
given argument, knowing the value of f1 precludes some value for the output of f2. Policy compli-
ance then can be interpreted as limiting the information flow from the function f1 that returns a
service provider P ’s view of an interaction to a function f2 that encodes (non)membership in the
sensitive classes C ∈ C.
There are various other relaxations of noninterference (e.g., [45]). Any could be selectd as a
basis for compliance with 〈C,Θ, a〉, and the result will be a different privacy standard. For example,
a probabilistic policy language might allow avenance tags that are 4-tuples 〈C,Θ, a, p〉 that would
require that outgoing messages satisfying Θ not reveal membership in any sensitive classes C ∈ C
with probability above p. This could express policies like “service providers shouldn’t be able to
guess my age with probability above .5”
4.4 Local Checking of Compliance
To comply with a user’s privacy policy, a service provider must ensure that its outgoing messages
do not violate that policy. If a service provider is not aware of a policy, compliance is difficult for
even well-intentioned service providers. Two design choices mitigate this burden:
• Policy Dependency: A message is tagged with a policy only if it is possible for a service
provider to use the message contents in a manner that violates that policy.
• Policy Propagation: Policies stored in an avenance tag associated with the input to an
operation are attached to the output of that operation. In the case of multi-input operations,
the output (or outputs) of that operation are associated with the union of the policies asso-
ciated with input values.6 Auxiliary information for derived tags is synthesized according to
operation-specific procedures that must be available to all principles that handle the tag.
By adopting Policy Dependency and Policy Propagation, privacy compliance can be locally en-
forced. That is, if no local policy violation occurs—that is, no principal P sends a message that
violates any of the policies associated with that message—then no policy violations occur. Com-
pliance with avenance policies is, therefore, a reasonable expectation to place on service providers.
5Possibilistic noninterference is motivated by nondeterministic programs, in which a single input value can yield
multiple possible output values. It relaxes standard noninterference [19, 20], which stipulates that changes in secret
input do not change the (unique) public outputs. Since executions that distinguish between different environments in
a single class are not privacy violations (unlike the traditional information flow scenario), possibilistic noninterference
is the more appropriate.
6While sufficient, this can lead to avenance tags that include unnecessary policies. So, it seems useful to consider
a declassification mechanism, whereby a principal may replace some of the policies by a signed assertion that those
policies have become irrelevant (that is, no subsequent messages or actions can violate that policy, either due to
independence from the input value or temporal restrictions).
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4.5 Policy Enforcement
There are two general approaches to thwarting harms from policy violations: prevention and de-
tection. Prevention ensures that violations do not occur, but it can be expensive. Detection merely
ensures that policy violations are noticed; either recovery or deterrence through accountability is
employed to prevent harms. Of course, not all violations can be recovered from after detection
nor deterred by accountability. So a regime is typically adopted that lies somewhere along the
spectrum between prevention and detection, depending on the threat model and harms associated
with a particular deployment.
Policy tags are usually associated with prevention. For example, information flow control la-
bels [12, 27] are amenable to static enforcement measures. Programs are checked for policy com-
pliance by a compiler’s type checker, and only programs that successfully type check are compiled
and run. Provenance tags [33] and other information flow control systems [43, 14] can also be con-
servatively enforced at run-time—either by an operating system or by a application-level reference
monitor. Such dynamic prevention mechanisms often add performance overhead, and assurance
that dynamic reference monitors are consistently and correctly deployed can be difficult to achieve.
Work in computer security usually adopts a threat model in which a program and its inputs
are provided by an anonymous adversary that cannot be identified or held accountable. In the
context of Internet privacy, however, the adversaries are service providers. Service providers are
assumed to be rational economic actors who violate policies only for economic benefit. They thus
would be deterred by accountability. Moreover, since service providers are identifiable entities
operating in a defined jurisdiction, society provides means—regulating authorities—for punishing
non-compliant service providers through legal fines or reputation damage. Privacy policies are
therefore particularly well-suited to enforcement based on deterrence.
With avenance tags, policies are formulated in terms of attribute names. Yet it is not realistic
to assume that all users and service providers will agree on a single global lexicon. So different
names might be used to identify the same characteristic of an individual. For example, different
names might refer to different encodings of the same characteristic (e.g., age and birth date) or to
different characteristics that just happen to be correlated (e.g., age and social security number or
even age and taste in music). No computer program can know nor should the author of a privacy
policy be expected to know all relationships among the different attribute names. So that raises a
question about the feasibility of enforcing a policy described using avenance tags.
Our society, however, long ago evolved institutions and processes to deter harms that result
from violations in the spirit if not the letter of a policy. These institutions employ people to judge
whether a violation has occurred. The judges are provided with evidence of the circumstances
associated with some action, and the judges invoke common sense as well as knowledge of norms
when deciding whether some act violates a policy. Representatives from each side argue the case,
so the judges have only to decide on the relative merits of what they have seen.
We propose to leverage this prosecutorial approach for implementing deterrence through ac-
countability with avenance tags.
• The system is designed to furnish evidence to any user who claims harm and to any service
provider that needs to defend against such a claim. This evidence would include logs of inputs
and outputs, certified copies of programs used for processing requests, and certified copies of
data used and stored.
• An authority—like a court—is used to resolve disputes about whether some service provider’s
action violates some given user’s privacy policy. Judges are the arbiters, so they are able to
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between Principals in the Avenance Ecosystem
resolve questions about whether a policy that names specific attributes applies to differently-
named attributes.
5 The Avenance Ecosystem
Avenance tags alone are not sufficient to remedy all of the shortcomings of notice and consent. In
order to achieve that goal, we propose that users and service providers operate within an avenance
ecosystem that additionally includes identity providers, policy interfaces, and auditing parties. The
high-level architecture of the avenance ecosystem is shown in Figure 5.1.
5.1 Identity Providers
Avenance tags, which include sets of policies and auxiliary information, might grow ever larger as
a value travels through a system. So it could become infeasible to store all that information in
a tag. We instead propose to store user privacy policies and auxiliary information at an identity
provider—a user-trusted principal that acts as a proxy for the user.
We envision many identity providers being managed by different parties, so a user can select
which identity provider (or providers) to trust with each policy. Identity providers are assumed to
be available to users and service providers at all times.
Avenance tags then can be implemented as references to policies stored at an identity provider.
In theory, a service provider is expected to consult the policy associated with a value each time
an operation is invoked on that value or each time a message containing that value is sent. In
practice, the identity provider would grant time-limited leases on policies to service providers,
allowing service providers to use locally-cached copies of a policy until the lease expires. And also,
messages would contain policies with expiration times instead of references to policies.
Implementing avenance tags as references to policies stored at an identity provider enables
the avenance ecosystem to support user policy updates, because now users (or principals acting
on behalf of a user) can modify the single copy of the user privacy policy (stored at the identity
provider) and the updated policy will be automatically propagated to all values derived from the
associated data, including remotely stored values. However, this raises a question: What updates
are allowed?
Updated policies are problematic if the new policy must enforced retroactively. We therefore
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require that policies be ex ante facto. That is, an updated policy applies only to actions that
occur after the update is made. In order to support this requirement, operation executions are
timestamped (with the time defined by the identity provider when the tag is dereferenced for the
associated operation). And privacy policies are defined with respect to classes of time-stamped
operation executions.
5.2 Policy Interfaces
Policy interfaces are client-side code responsible for (1) collecting user privacy policies from a user
and forwarding them to an identity provider and (2) associating the correct avenance tags with all
information, including data that is generated based on observed behaviors. Users need only make
privacy decisions once for each attribute or behavior; the policy interface subsequently ensures that
all outgoing message are tagged. A message containing particular data is tagged with a policy
if and only if something a service provider can do with that data would cause the policy to be
violated. This design ensures that the actions required for a user to express their privacy do not
become excessive, even if a user interacts with many service providers.
Policy interfaces also ensure that privacy policies relating to observed behaviors can be ex-
pressed. This includes policies like “Do not target ads based on the websites I visit” as well as “Do
not infer my age from observed behaviors”. A policy interface can automatically associate such
tags with all HTTP requests, because all observed behaviors are derived from these requests.
5.3 Auditing Parties
Deterrence requires there to be a user-trusted auditing party having access to the appropriate
records, the ability to detect violations, and the means to ensure that an appropriate party is
punished. In order to achieve this:
1. All violations must be detectable. That is, for every violation there must be evidence available
that irrefutably indicates that a violation occurred.
2. All violations must be unequivocally attributable to a guilty party.
In an avenance ecosystem there could be many auditing parties, some of which might also
function as identity providers or in other roles. Auditing parties access append-only logs in order to
detect and attribute policy violations. These logs can be maintained by any party and might record
operations performed, messages sent or received, or proofs of policy compliance. Depending on the
design of the logging scheme, an auditing party might (1) detect violations just from examining the
logs, (2) detect violations by interacting with service providers using test inputs and by observing
the outputs, or (3) inspect the source code to detect violations. In the event that a violation is
detected, the evidence is communicated to an external legal system for prosecution.
6 Conclusion
Avenance tags are a new proposal for enhancing Internet privacy. They implement a privacy policy
language that combines control with secrecy to solve the problem of expressiveness, and they are
deployed within the context of a system designed to address the other shortcomings of notice
and consent. While the described avenance ecosystem is a long way from practical deployment,
we believe it offers an interesting, viable avenue for future work. And we are now attempting a
prototype implementation.
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